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38 
[Insert Company Name] Sucks: A 





In his article “Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A 
Corporate Public Figure Doctrine,” Professor Deven Desai 
argues that corporations have a privileged amount of control 
over speech about them. As a result, he says that the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence requires the law to 
recognize a corporate public figure doctrine that applies in 
trademark infringement and dilution actions.1 Doing so, 
according to Desai, would “ensure that speech rights are 
properly balanced” while collapsing the supposedly 
unnecessary legal distinction between commercial and political 
speech.2  
Professor Desai is correct that corporations today are able 
and willing to have a powerful impact on public dialogue 
regarding both commercial and political matters. In this sense, 
corporations often play a role that is analogous to a public 
figure. However, his analysis leading up to his conclusion falls 
short for several reasons. This essay responds to Desai’s article, 
focusing on his analysis of infringement and dilution suits. Part 
I argues that corporations do not have a privileged amount of 
control over speech about them because trademark 
infringement and dilution actions do not place any meaningful 
limits on peoples’ ability to critique corporations. Part II argues 
that, even if corporations did enjoy a privileged amount of 
control over speech about them, the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence does not require the adoption of a 
corporate public figure doctrine. Part III presents a conclusion. 
 
 * Byron Crowe is a corporate associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale 
and Dorr LLP in Boston. He holds a J.D. from Cornell Law School and a B.A. 
in economics from Tufts University. 
 1. Deven R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public 
Figure Doctrine, 98 MINN. L. REV. 455, 457–59, 501 (2013). 
 2. Id. at 457. 
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I.  CORPORATIONS DO NOT HAVE A PRIVILEGED 
AMOUNT OF CONTROL   
Professor Desai’s first premise is that corporations have a 
privileged amount of control over speech about them relative to 
natural persons. According to Desai, in light of the rights 
granted to corporations in Citizens United,3 “an imbalance in 
corporate speech law” 4 has emerged that “provide[s] 
corporations with a speech advantage”5 over individuals. Thus, 
“[i]f corporations are afforded the same speech rights as and 
against individuals . . . , individuals should have the same 
rights against corporations.”6 
Desai’s argument is problematic because individuals and 
corporations do have the same speech rights as and against 
each other. As he notes, Citizens United provided corporations 
with essentially the same First Amendment speech rights as 
natural persons.7 However, trademark law and defamation law 
do not make a distinction between corporations and individuals 
for the purpose of bringing suits. Both natural persons and 
corporations can own and enforce trademarks8 as well as 
initiate defamation suits.9  
This symmetry also extends to defending speech suits. In 
defending a defamation suit, natural persons and corporations 
can invoke the public figure doctrine, which requires the 
plaintiff to make a showing of actual malice where the plaintiff 
is a public figure.10 While the Supreme Court has not officially 
 
 3. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 4. See Desai, supra note 1 at 479. 
 5. Id. at 480. 
 6. Id. at 495. 
 7. Id. at 459; see Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343 (“The Court has thus 
rejected the argument that political speech of corporations . . . should be 
treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such 
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”) (citation omitted). 
 8. See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 
638 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011) (involving a corporate plaintiff suing a 
corporate defendant for trademark infringement); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 
F.3d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 2005) (involving individual plaintiff suing an individual 
defendant for trademark infringement). 
 9. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (involving an 
individual plaintiff suing a corporation for libel); VECC, Inc. v. Bank of Nova 
Scotia, 296 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621 (D.V.I. 2003) (involving a corporate plaintiff 
suing a corporate defendant for defamation). 
 10. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (“Those who . . . are . . . public figures and 
those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to reputation only 
on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with 
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.”); D. Mark 
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recognized the status of corporate plaintiffs for the purposes of 
the doctrine,11 the lower courts have widely held that corporate 
plaintiffs can be public figures in defamation suits.12 In suits for 
trademark infringement or dilution, the courts uniformly do 
not apply the public figure doctrine whether the plaintiff is a 
natural person or a corporation. 
Moreover, individuals enjoy certain speech-related rights 
that corporations do not. The right of publicity, for example, 
which is the state-law based “right of every human being to 
control the commercial use of his or her identity,”13 gives 
individuals but not corporations a cause of action for 
misappropriation of their identity or persona.14 This right, 
which the Supreme Court has validated, 15 gives individuals 
additional control over speech about them beyond trademark 
and defamation law. Likewise, the right against being placed in 
a false light, which is recognized in about two-thirds of states,16 
protects human plaintiffs but not business entities.17 
Considering these exclusively individual rights, Desai’s 
statement that “a nationally famous corporate person is treated 
differently than its natural-person counterpart” 18 is only true 
in the opposite manner of what he intended. 
 
 
Jackson, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPs: Revisiting 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 491, 497–99 (2001). 
 11. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 502 (“the Supreme Court has yet to 
establish the status of corporate defamation plaintiffs.”). But see Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
 12. See, e.g., Steaks Unlimited, Inc., v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 
1980) (holding that the corporate plaintiff was a public figure because it 
“injected itself into a matter of public interest” through a four-day meat sale 
with a large amount of advertising); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe 
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 589 (1st Cir. 1980) (recognizing that 
corporations can be public figures); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star 
Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 957 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that corporate 
defense contractor was a public figure). See generally Jackson, supra note 10, 
at 503–08. 
 13. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d 
ed). 
 14. See THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS V, 31 CAUSES OF ACTION § 5 (West 
2013). 
 15. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977). 
 16. Getting It Right, But in a “False Light,” REPORTER’S COMMITTEE FOR 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/ 
digital-journalists-legal-guide/getting-it-right-false-light-0 (last visited Aug. 5, 
2014). 
 17. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 
4:41 (2d ed). 
 18. Desai, supra note 1, at 458. 





Speech protected by First 
Amendment? 
Yes Yes
Can own and enforce 
trademarks? 
Yes Yes
Can initiate a defamation 
action? 
Yes Yes
Courts have applied 
public figure doctrine to 
plaintiffs in defamation 
suits?
Yes Yes
Courts have applied 
public figure doctrine to 
plaintiffs in trademark 
infringement and dilution 
suits?
No No




Symmetry, however, is not Desai’s primary concern. The 
problem, he says, is that the current regime of corporate 
reputational laws,19 “limits [everyone’s] ability to critique a 
corporate public figure.”20 Desai supports this assertion by 
pointing to actions for trademark infringement and dilution 
under the Lanham Act. Because corporations are aggressive 
enforcers of trademarks, he says infringement and dilution 
actions “hinder [everyone’s] ability to use speech to question 
and police corporations.”21 Unfortunately, Desai’s 
characterization of U.S. trademark law is incomplete.  
A. FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION 
As Desai notes, federal dilution law protects famous marks 
from burring or tarnishment and allows corporations to sue 
even where there is no risk of confusion,22 so long as there has 
been actual dilution of the holder’s trademark.23 Dilution 
actions also do not inquire into whether the information 
 
 19. Desai mentions defamation as being included in this group of 
“corporate reputation laws.” Id. at 457. However, his analysis focuses on 
trademark infringement and dilution. 
 20. Id. at 475. 
 21. Id. at 482. 
 22. See id. at 483; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012). 
 23. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
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conveyed was false.24 As a result, Desai claims that “[d]ilution 
law fails to accommodate the criticism that should be possible 
for a public figure.”25  
However, Desai’s claim ignores the federal dilution 
exemptions. These statutory provisions explicitly protect 
criticizing, parodying, and commenting on famous marks, on 
their owners, or on their owners’ goods or services. 26 The 
exemptions also include news commentary and any other non-
commercial use of a mark.27 Thus, it is unclear how federal 
dilution law keeps an individual from criticizing a corporation 
or its products. 
This inconsistency does not stop Desai. He states that, 
despite their current breadth, “the exemptions simply do not 
cover what they should.”28 What should they cover? Desai tells 
us that the exemptions should focus on “the criticism and 
commentary inquiries needed for speech about public figures.”29 
This is an unsatisfactory explanation for two reasons. First, as 
abovementioned, the exemptions already include criticism and 
commentary. Second, even if they did not, Desai’s reasoning is 
circular: he argues that the inadequacy of dilution exemptions 
is why the law must recognize a corporate public figure 
doctrine but uses the absence of the doctrine as the reason the 
dilution exemptions are inadequate. 
Lastly, Desai critiques the dilution exemptions for being 
ambiguous, which he says “put[s] us in a world of late case 
resolution and uncertainty about liability.”30 However, in the 
context of critical speech about corporations, his concern over 
the statute’s ambiguity is completely unfounded: “parodying, 
criticizing, or commenting” unquestionably includes the type of 
speech Desai is concerned about. Indeed, under the current 
framework, individuals are free to compare large corporations 
to Nazis and terrorists and even make a profit from doing so.31 
Moreover, it is unlikely that the alternative, a corporate 
public figure doctrine, would be much better. Under Desai’s 
 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 25. Desai, supra note 1, at 484. 
 26. See 5 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012). It is worth noting that while Desai 
recognizes some of the exemptions, he conveniently omits criticism in his 
above-the-line analysis. See Desai, supra note 1, at 484. 
 27. See 5 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
 28. Desai, supra note 1, at 484. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 485. 
 31. See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D. 
Ga. 2008). 
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proposal, public figure corporations would be required to prove 
actual malice for dilution actions. Actual malice, in turn, would 
require the plaintiff to show that the statement including the 
mark was false and that it was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the statement’s truth.32 
While this higher standard would mean summary judgment 
could be a more effective tool for defending dilution suits, 
actual malice is still a highly-factual inquiry and the additional 
step of determining which corporations are public figures could 
complicate litigation, meaning less certainty at the outset. 
B. FEDERAL TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
After exhausting his dilution analysis, Desai moves on to 
the Lanham Act’s provisions on trademark infringement. Here, 
he critiques the current infringement framework because it 
allows the object of speech to control the speech’s content.33 
According to Desai, current trademark law is flawed because 
“[m]ark holders, not consumers, bring trademark suits”34 and 
because mark holders can use cease-and-desist letters and 
strike suits to chill speech.35 However, this would still be 
possible under his proposed arrangement. Even if a corporate 
public figure doctrine applied to the Lanham Act, consumers 
would still be unable to bring infringement suits and 
trademark owners would still be able to send cease-and-desist 
letters and bring meritless infringement suits. 
Moreover, the fact that trademark holders can bring 
lawsuits under the current regime does not mean that they are 
successful. As Desai notes, a successful claim for infringement 
requires at the very least a showing that the use of the mark is 
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association” between the 
plaintiff and defendant or their products.36 This test is fact-
intensive, has multiple factors, and is rarely amenable to 
summary judgment.37 However, just because the test is fact-
driven does not mean it does not protect the types of speech 
Desai is concerned with. Indeed, it is hard to see how any fact 
 
 32. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, (1974). 
 33. Desai, supra note 1, at 486. 
 34. Id. at 485. 
 35. Id. at 486. 
 36. Id.; 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 37. See Desai, supra note 1, at 486. However, in cases involving unrelated 
goods, for example, the analysis can be much simpler: “If the goods are totally 
unrelated, there can be no infringement because confusion is unlikely.” See 
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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finder could be confused about the association of the plaintiff 
and defendant where the defendant is criticizing a corporation 
or its products. 
Of course, the fact-intensive nature of the confusion 
analysis under the current regime means defendants must 
incur great costs to defend meritless suits. However, these costs 
are also borne by plaintiffs, and corporations may be unwilling 
to bear these additional costs where an infringement suit is 
meritless. This along with the possibility of sanctions38 and 
disciplinary action39 for attorneys who bring meritless claims 
reduces the risk of meritless suits under the current 
infringement and dilution frameworks. 
C. DILUTION AND INFRINGEMENT: THE COMMERCIAL USE 
REQUIREMENT 
Desai’s worry that the Lanham Act is being used to silence 
corporate critics is also problematic for a more fundamental 
reason: actions under the Lanham Act for infringement or 
dilution must be predicated on a “commercial use” of a mark.40 
The Lanham Act does not prohibit a noncommercial use of 
another’s trademark,41 and courts have generally construed 
what constitutes commercial use in a narrow manner. 
What is a commercial use? For the purposes of trademark 
infringement, the Sixth,42 Ninth,43 and Tenth44 Circuits, as well 
as the District Court for District of Columbia,45 have all 
 
 38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 39. See American Bar Association Model Rule 3.1. 
 40. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) & (c). 
 41. R. Kent Warren, Interpreting Commercial Speech under the Lanham 
Act’s Commercial Use Requirement: Tension Between Online Trademark and 
First Amendment Free Speech Rights, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 342, 343 (2006). 
 42. See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2003) (“As 
long as [the defendant] has no commercial links on either of his websites . . . 
we find no use ‘in connection with the advertising’ of goods and services to 
enjoin, and the Lanham Act cannot be properly invoked.”). 
 43. See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 
2005) (finding no commercial use where defendant created website to expose 
negative information about plaintiff’s services on the internet). 
 44. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & 
Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1052 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding district court’s 
finding that defendant’s use was not a commercial because it “provided no 
goods or services, earned no revenue, and had no direct links to any 
commercial sites.”). 
 45. See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C. 
1985) (“Defendants' only activity is trying to communicate their ideas. 
Purveying points of view is not a service. Even if promoting of ideas was 
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concluded that there is no commercial use unless a trademark 
was used for some type of commercial gain, like the sale of 
products or services. The First Circuit has also suggested it 
would follow this reasoning.46 Only a minority of federal courts 
have adopted a more expansive boundary for the commercial 
use requirement in infringement suits.47 And even in these 
courts, plaintiffs still must show that the mark was either used 
in connection with the provision of a product or service48 or used 
to harm the plaintiff commercially.49 
Showing commercial use is even more difficult for dilution 
actions. Congress explicitly included an exemption for “[a]ny 
noncommercial use of a mark.”50 Thus, “courts applying the 
exception have held that all speech which is not purely 
commercial . . . is subject to the exception.”51  
Through its infringement and dilution provisions, the only 
type of speech that the Lanham Act prohibits about a 
corporation is speech that uses the corporation’s trademark (or 
a similar one) and that is commercial in nature. When this 
requirement is combined with infringement’s confusion 
requirement and dilution’s statutory exemptions, it is hard to 
see how the broader public is being kept from criticizing 
corporations. This is especially true where the critical speech is 
artistic.52 Indeed, in most of the cases that Desai cites, the 
 
considered to be conducting an educational ‘service,’ television messages that 
are only used to express those ideas do not sell or advertise them.”). 
 46. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 207 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 47. See Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998) 
aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that defendants use constituted a 
commercial use of the mark because it was to harm the plaintiff 
commercially); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 
F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff only needed to show that 
defendants use prevented users from obtaining or using defendant’s goods or 
services); see also United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. New 
York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See Jews For Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 308; Doughney, 263 F.3d at 365. 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012). 
 51. Griffith v. Fenrick, 486 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2007); see also 
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating in 
its analysis of a dilution action that “[i]f speech is not ‘purely commercial’—
that is, if it does more than propose a commercial transaction—then it is 
entitled to full First Amendment protection.”); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 
433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 52. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902; Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 
(2d Cir. 1989) (“[Our] construction of the Lanham Act accommodates consumer 
and artistic interests. It insulates from restriction titles with at least minimal 
artistic relevance that are ambiguous or only implicitly misleading but leaves 
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defendants prevailed.53 He gives few cases where a defendant’s 
criticism of a corporation was successfully enjoined under the 
current trademark regime.54 And even in those cases where the 
plaintiff was successful, the speech in question was decidedly 
commercial.55 
D. THE SUPPOSEDLY BLURRED LINE BETWEEN COMMERCIAL 
AND POLITICAL SPEECH 
Desai, however, argues that the commercial use 
requirement is inadequate to protect speech because “the 
distinction between commercial and political [speech] has 
collapsed so much that the need to ensure a high flow of 
information about corporations and their goods and services is 
great, regardless of the label on such information.”56 In support 
of this, he cites examples of corporations taking stances on 
political issues57 as well as the influence of consumers’ political 
persuasions on their purchasing decisions.58  
As an example of the latter, Desai points to Nike Inc. v. 
Kasky.59 In that case, Nike launched a campaign to protect its 
 
vulnerable to claims of deception titles that are explicitly misleading as to 
source or content, or that have no artistic relevance at all.”). 
 53. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 
252, 269 (4th Cir. 2007); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 
792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902. 
 54. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994); 
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 10 CIV. 1611 PKC, 2012 
WL 1022247 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 
346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 55. Of course, that is not to say that none of the cases support his premise 
that corporations can quash criticism about their brand. One case that is 
particularly concerning is Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d 
Cir. 1994). In Deere, the Second Circuit enjoined an advertisement that 
depicted a modified version of John Deere’s trademark running away from the 
competitor’s lawn tractor and a barking dog. Id. at 45. This case is 
disconcerting from a First Amendment perspective because the defendant’s 
dilutive use was both comparative in nature and critical of John Deere. 
However, even here, the defendant was a corporation whose primary motive 
for running the advertisement was profit, not public dialogue. Moreover, the 
Deere case is likely the low-water mark for commercial speech protection since 
it appears to be the first case ever to hold a defendant liable for making good-
humored and non-confusing fun of a competitor’s logo. See Mary LaFrance, 
Steam Shovels and Lipstick: Trademarks, Greed, and the Public Domain, 6 
NEVADA L.J. 447, 468 (2006). 
 56. Desai, supra note 1, at 467. 
 57. Id. at 487, 506 (noting Chick-fil-A, Google, Nabisco, and J.C. Penney’s 
stance on gay rights). 
 58. See id. at 472–74. 
 59. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (2002); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini 
Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), 
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image in response to allegations that the company engaged in 
unethical labor practices abroad.60 Kasky, a private citizen, 
then sued Nike under California law, alleging that Nike had 
made false and misleading statements about its labor practices 
during its campaign.61 Because Nike’s speech was motivated by 
commercial concerns, Desai states that it was “simultaneously 
commercial speech and political speech.”62 
However, this example—along with the rest that Desai 
explores63—only establishes that corporations and people are 
increasingly considering politics in their economic decision 
making. It does not support the proposition that commercial 
information is playing a greater role in people’s political 
decision making and thus deserves greater First Amendment 
protection. That is, while a consumer may take into account a 
company’s politics in deciding to buy a product, Desai gives us 
no examples—hypothetical or otherwise—where a corporation’s 
reputation now has an impact on an individual’s political 
choices. Unless and until this is shown, the current 
framework’s requirement of a commercial use for dilution and 
infringement actions provides sufficient protection for speech 
about corporations. 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT 
REQUIRE A CORPORATE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE   
Professor Desai’s argument is also flawed because it 
mischaracterizes how to apply the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Desai argues that corporate speech 
is privileged and that commercial speech today has greater 
political significance. However, even if both these statements 
were true, it would not follow that “the logic of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding corporate speech and public 
figures requires that the law recognize a corporate public figure 
doctrine” for trademark and dilution actions.64 
Desai is correct in his assertion that the Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment cases prefer more speech,65 even where the 
 
 60. Desai, supra note 1, at 487. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 488. 
 63. See supra notes 57 & 58. 
 64. See Desai, supra note 1, at 459. 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (“The 
requirements of a knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth as the 
condition for recovery in certain defamation cases exists to allow more speech, 
not less.”). 
48 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:38 
 
content of that speech is factually incorrect. The Court’s prior 
cases have preferred counter-speech as the appropriate means 
of correcting a false claim as opposed to banning the initial 
false statement.66 As the Court said in Sullivan, “erroneous 
statement[s] are inevitable in free debate, and [they] must be 
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive.’”67 Through the 
“marketplace of ideas,” false statements will tend to be 
discredited.68 As a result, the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence has a high tolerance for incorrect political 
speech. 
Also, while commercial speech receives a lower amount of 
First Amendment protection,69 the Court has explicitly stated 
that commercial speech is not stripped of all protection.70 Why? 
As the Court has recognized, commercial speech still adds 
value to the marketplace of ideas.71 With this in mind, Desai’s 
reasoning seems intuitive: If (A) commercial speech now has a 
political impact, (B) the Court’s jurisprudence tolerates false 
speech that has a political impact and (C) trademark and 
dilution actions do nothing more than censor false commercial 
statements, then (D) the Court’s reasoning should require 
actual malice for some infringement and dilution actions, like it 
does in defamation cases. 
However, even if premises (A) and (B) were correct, 
premise (C) is not. Trademark infringement and dilution 
actions do not concern themselves with the truthfulness of the 
speech in question. Neither action requires the defendant’s 
statements to be untrue.72 Rather, infringement and dilution 
are meant to protect the identity of the speaker. By contrast, the 
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has not primarily 
 
 66. See Desai, supra note 1, at 508. 
 67. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72, (1964). 
 68. See Gregory Brazeal, How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 3 (2011). 
 69. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012); Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) 
(“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech 
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”). 
 70. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
 71. See id.; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“The 
relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not 
make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.”). 
 72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) & § 1125 (2012). Of course, an action for 
false advertising does require an untrue statement. However, that is outside 
the scope of this essay, which focuses on infringement and dilution. 
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concerned itself with the identity of the speaker. Instead, it has 
focused on the content of the speech. This makes trademark 
and dilution distinguishable from the Court’s previous 
reasoning on false speech. While the Court tolerates false 
speech because the marketplace of ideas can sort it out, the 
marketplace itself may rely on the integrity of the sources of 
information. That is, if the speech of sources who have a 
reputation for truth and quality is valued more than others, 
protecting the identity of the speakers (and the trademarks by 
which they identify themselves) may be necessary for the 
marketplace to work. If consumers cannot identify the sources 
of the products and information in the market, they will be 
unable to distinguish trustworthy products and information 
from the rest. 
  CONCLUSION   
Despite its shortcomings, Desai’s analysis brings up a 
number of important issues in the current legal framework. For 
example, the power and prominence of corporations in today’s 
society means they do sometimes play a role analogous to 
public figures. Thus, as other scholars have argued, it may be 
appropriate to treat some types of corporate plaintiffs as per se 
public figures in the context of defamation suits. 73 
Also, while the current framework generally does not give 
corporations a privileged amount of control over speech about 
them, there are some jurisdictions where the courts have 
arguably not done enough to protect speech. For example, the 
Third and Fourth Circuits have adopted a broad understanding 
of what constitutes a commercial use for the purposes of 
infringement suits.74 These courts only require a showing that 
the defendant’s use will harm the plaintiff commercially.75 This 
broad definition of commercial use likely chills noncommercial 
speech while severely chaffing the First Amendment. 
Lastly, as Desai notes, the dilution exemptions of the 
Lanham Act do not apply to state actions for dilution. While 
twelve states along with the District of Columbia and Puerto 
Rico do not have dilution statutes,76 the statutes of the 
 
 73. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 492. I do not weigh in on the wisdom of 
doing so. 
 74. See Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998) 
aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998); People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 75. See id. 
 76. Patrick Bickley, Almost Famous: Finding a Role for State Dilution 
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remaining states generally do not include explicit exemptions 
like those of the Lanham Act.77 In these states, defendants 
must affirmatively raise a defense under the First Amendment. 
As Professor Mary LaFrance has noted, judicial responses to 
these First Amendment arguments have been inconsistent.78 
This has resulted in concerning cases like Deere, which was 
brought under a state dilution statute.79 Moreover, the trend 
seems to be that traditional expressive works are receiving less 
protection under these state statutes than under the Lanham 
Act.80 To partially resolve these inconsistencies, some have 
suggested Congress give preemptive effect to the Lanham Act’s 
dilution exceptions.81 
However, none of these problems give sufficient support for 
Desai’s conclusion that the law needs to recognize a public 
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 77. See LaFrance, supra note 55, at 462. 
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